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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Ford v. Wainwright' held that
the eighth amendment prohibits execution of the insane.2 As a result,
prisoners awaiting execution now have a constitutional right not to be
executed if they are found incompetent. By constitutionalizing what
had been largely a common law or statutory right, the Court also in-
structed states to establish procedures to insure that execution of the
insane did not in fact occur. Historically, those procedures that gov-
erned the determination of competency to suffer execution centered
around "competency to be executed examinations" performed by
1. 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986).
2. Id. The legal concept of "insanity" in this context translates to the psychological
assessment of whether the prisoner is "incompetent to suffer execution."
COMPETENCY TO BE EXECUTED
mental health professionals. Many of these procedures failed to take
into account ethical and practical dilemmas inherent in the perform-
ance of such examinations. Today most states, including Nebraska,
have yet to reform their laws to comply with the Court's holding in
Ford. The purpose of this comment is to present a psycholegal analy-
sis examining how psychology may best be considered when construct-
ing constitutional statutes.
Part H of this comment outlines the contours of the legal context
which govern "competency to be executed" evaluations. Primarily,
this is accomplished by noting the recent Supreme Court decision that
both establishes a substantive right for prisoners and suggests proce-
dures a state may adopt to safeguard this right. Part III explores the
nature of the specific assessment of competency by examining both
legal and psychological tests. Specifically reviewed are the ethical and
practical considerations facing an evaluator called upon to perform a
''competency to be executed" evaluation.
In Part IV, Nebraska's current statutory procedure for determin-
ing competency to suffer executions is analyzed and shown to be con-
stitutionally defective. Finally, recommendations are made to both
remedy Nebraska's statute and facilitate the interaction bf law with
psychology in conducting assessments of competency to suffer
execution.
II. LEGAL CONTEXT
The legal context in which competency examinations for the pur-
pose of execution are administered has changed recently as a result of
the Supreme Court's decision in Ford v. Wainwright.3 Ford is dis-
cussed in some detail for two reasons. First, the case provides a typical
example of the legal proceedings surrounding a prisoner awaiting exe-
cution. Second, the case announces the law relevant to determining
competency to suffer execution and suggests the likely paths states
will take when reworking their statutes.
A. Facts of the Case
Alvin Ford was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1974
by a Florida state court. He was sane at time of the offense, trial, and
sentencing. He subsequently began to act abnormally, showing signs
of an apparent mental disorder. Ford's counsel had two psychiatrists
examine him, one of whom determined that Ford was incompetent to
suffer execution. Ford's counsel then invoked the Florida statute
used to determine competency of prisoners awaiting execution.4 The
Governor of Florida, following procedures outlined in the statute, ap-
3. Id.
4. FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985).
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pointed three psychiatrists to examine Ford. Together they examined
him for thirty minutes in the presence of eight other people. Two of
the psychiatrists concluded that Ford understood enough to be exe-
cuted. The other psychiatrist concluded that Ford did not understand
the nature of the proceedings against him and, therefore was insane.
The Governor then signed a death warrant.
After unsuccessfully seeking a hearing in state court to determine
anew Ford's competency, Ford's counsel filed a habeas corpus proceed-
ing in federal district court, seeking an evidentiary hearing. The dis-
trict court denied the petition without a hearing, the court of appeals
affirmed, and the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal.5
B. Holdings of the Court
The first issue the Supreme Court addressed was whether the
eighth amendment prohibits the execution of the insane. The Court
first reviewed the reasoning behind the common-law prohibitions
against executing the insane, noting that "virtually no authority con-
doning the execution of the insane at English common law" was
known.6 Further, "It]he various reasons put forth in support of the
common-law restriction have no less logical, moral, and practical force
than they did when first voiced."7 The Court claimed it was compelled
to conclude that the eighth amendment prohibits a state from carrying
out a sentence of death upon a prisoner who is insane.8 Thus, prison-
ers sentenced to death and later determined to be insane have a consti-
tutional right not to be executed.
After having determined that insane prisoners have a constitu-
tional right not to be executed, the Supreme Court held, by a five-to-
four vote, that due process requirements shall accompany this right.9
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist emphasized the real problem the Court
faced - "[s]ince no state sanctions execution of the insane, the real
battle being fought in this case is over what procedures must accom-
5. Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526 (11th Cir.), cert granted, 106 S. Ct. 566 (1985).
6. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2601 (1986).
7. Id. at 2602.
8. Only three previous Supreme Court decisions addressed this issue. In Nobles v.
Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897), the Supreme Court upheld a state court's dismissal
of a prisoner's petition for a hearing, stating that a jury trial was unnecessary.
Fifty-three years later in Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950), the Court stated
that the state was under no obligation to provide a hearing. In Caritativo v. Cali-
fornia, 357 U.S. 549 (1958), the Court issued a per curium opinion upholding the
California Supreme Court's ruling that the courts lacked jurisdiction to consider
the sanity of a condemned prisoner unless the warden initiated an inquiry into
the prisoner's sanity.
9. Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens voted that due process re-
quirements shall accompany this right. Justice Powell wrote an opinion which
concurred in part and result. Justices O'Conner and White concurred in the re-
sult in part and dissented in part. Justices Burger and Rehnquist dissented.
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pany the inquiry into sanity."1o Because a constitutional right was
now involved, the Court scrutinized whether Florida's procedures
were adequate for the purpose of determining sanity."1 The Court
concluded that Florida's procedures for determining sanity were inad-
equate to preclude federal review of the federal issue. Specifically,
Florida's statute was found to violate due process in three ways: "the
denial of any opportunity to challenge or impeach the state-appointed
psychiatrists' opinions"; "placement of the decision wholly within the
executive branch"; and "failure to include the prisoner in the truth-
seeking process."'12 As a consequence, the Court held that the district
court must grant a hearing de novo on the question of whether Ford
was competent to stand execution.
C. Court Suggestions to Remedy the Statute
A constitutional right was at stake in Ford; therefore, due process
was required. The Court wrote four separate opinions in attempting
to identify what procedures would qualify as passing due process re-
quirements. Speaking for the Court, Justice Marshall stated: "We do
not here suggest that only a full trial on the issue of sanity will suffice
to protect the federal interests; we leave to the State the task of devel-
oping appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon
its execution of sentences." 13 Thus, the task of enacting legislation
which provides the constitutional safeguards necessary to survive fed-
eral review of sanity of a prisoner awaiting execution is left to the
states. Although the Court placed the responsibility of constructing a
constitutional statute on the states, the opinions of Justices Marshall,
O'Connor, and Powell offer advice as to how states may meet this task.
In the opinion of the Court, Justice Marshall noted that the "lode-
star of any effort to devise a procedure must be the overriding dual
10. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2615 (1986)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "San-
ity," as a legal term of art is used to refer to the legal defense used in criminal
proceedings, as well as a pseudonym for "competency" in other contexts.
Whatever the context, a finding of sanity generally goes to answering the legal
question and not the forensic question facing an examiner - that is, whether the
prisoner understands the nature of his execution.
11. Florida's statutory procedures were found to be inadequate for the purpose of
determining a condemned prisoner's sanity because: (1) they failed to provide an
adequate assurance of accuracy sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Townsend
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); (2) they failed to provide a fact-finding procedure
"adequate to afford a full and fair hearing" on the critical issue as required by 28
U.S.C. section 2254 (d)(2); and (3) no state court played a role in any determina-
tion to which a presumption of correctness under section 2254 (d)(2) could attach.
Thus, the Court held that the petitioner was entitled to a de novo evidentiary
hearing in the district court on the question of his competency to be executed.
Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2602-03 (1986).
12. Id. at 2604-05.
13. Id. at 2605-06.
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imperative of providing redress for those with substantial claims [of
insanity] and of encouraging accuracy in the fact-finding determina-
tion."14 Justice Marshall also stated that a substantial threshold of
what constitutes insanity may be necessary in order to hold down the
number of frivolous claims.15 Additionally, he noted that the adver-
sarial presentation of evidence by experts is important in the effort to
insure due process.16 Finally, he suggested that states look to their
own procedures for determining whether a defendant is competent to
stand trial.17
Justice Powell agreed that Florida's statute was deficient in not al-
lowing Ford a chance to present evidence on his own behalf, but Pow-
ell nevertheless took a more restrictive view of the state's obligation to
comport with due process. Justice Powell first noted that because a
prisoner was initially found competent to stand trial, a substantial
threshold showing of insanity was justified to trigger the due process
requirements. Justice Powell then stated that the question was pri-
marily a subjective one based on expert opinion and the ordinary ad-
versary model was not "necessarily the best means of arriving at
sound, consistent judgments as to a defendant's sanity."1 8 Justice
Powell acknowledged that the Court need not determine the precise
limits that due process imposes in this area, but he nevertheless sug-
gested his view of how the state could go about meeting constitutional
requirements: "[M]y view is that a constitutionally acceptable proce-
dure may be far less formal than a trial. The State should provide an
impartial officer or board that can receive evidence and argument
from the prisoner's counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence that
may differ from the state's own psychiatric examination."19
Justice O'Connor, in an opinion joined by Justice White, concurred
in part and dissented in part. Regarding the extent to which due pro-
cess should be accorded, O'Connor noted that "[o]nce society has val-
idly convicted an individual of a crime and therefore established its
right to punish, the demands of due process are reduced accord-
14. Id. at 2606.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at n.4. The Court first made reference to Florida's statutes for appointing
experts and determining competence to stand trial. FLA. STAT. §§ 916.11-916.12
(1985 & Supp. 1986). This statute allows the court to appoint at least two but no
more than three psychiatrists or psychologists to examine the mental condition of
a defendant. The statute further states that to the extent possible, one of the
appointed psychiatrists should be state-employed. The Court also referred to
Florida's statute for involuntary placement. FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (Supp. 1986).
This statute specifically details due process requirements to which an involuntary
placed person is entitled.
18. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2611 (1986)(Poweil, J., concurring).
19. Id.
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ingly."2 0 Additionally, Justice O'Connor raised the problem that the
interest of not being executed while insane can never be finally deter-
mined. Up to the moment of execution, the prisoner may claim to be
incompetent to suffer execution, and thus require determination of
that issue. Justice O'Connor, however, emphasized that there must be
an opportunity to be heard, echoing the concern voiced earlier by both
the majority and Justice Powell.
Writing in dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Bur-
ger, claimed that no constitutional basis for a right of the insane not to
be executed existed, and, therefore, it was unnecessary to comment on
what procedures a state should adopt.
In summary, the Supreme Court found Florida's procedures for de-
termining the competency of a prisoner awaiting execution to be inad-
equate. Although the specific question of how the State of Florida
might remedy its procedures was not addressed directly, Justices Mar-
shall, Powell, and O'Connor each identified factors they would have
considered in determining whether due process requirements were
met. These suggested procedures form a continuum from the maxi-
mum of a full trial to the minimum of allowing the prisoner a chance
to present evidence on his own behalf.
In holding that Florida's statute was unconstitutional, the Court
called into question the constitutionality of every state statute which
had similar provisions.21 Of the states which currently have statutes
identifying procedures to be used when a condemned prisoner is
thought to be insane, none provide the opportunity for a prisoner
either to present evidence on his own behalf or challenge the testi-
mony of court-appointed psychiatrists.22 With over 1,900 prisoners on
death row across the country and an average of at least one person
being added every two days,2 3 there is likely to be an increase in
claims for incompetency once a person has been convicted and sen-
tenced to death. There remains then, the task of revising these state
statutes in order to comport with due process as outlined by the
Supreme Court's decision in Ford. Such revisions should include not
only consideration of the appropriate legal reforms, but also how those
legal reforms affect the administration of the underlying psychological
test.
20. Id. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
21. The Court noted that 26 states currently had procedures for the stay of execution
due to intervening insanity. Id. at 2601 n.2.
22. S. BRACKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 706
(3d ed. 1985).
23. See JusTIcE STATISTICS BULLTIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1
1987.
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III. LEGAL TEST
The first task in establishing constitutional procedures is to deter-
mine an appropriate legal test. The legal test for determining compe-
tency to suffer execution varies in language across jurisdictions but
remains substantively the same. The common-law definition was
"that the condemned man is aware of his conviction and the nature of
his impending fate."2 4 Some state statutes contain the additional pro-
vision that the prisoner have the capacity to assist counsel in relevant
legal tasks.25 Combining the two, commentary to the Criminal Justice
Mental Health Standards suggests the following legal test:
Does the inmate understand the nature of the proceedings against him, what
he was tried for, the purpose of the punishment, or the nature of the punish-
ment? Does the inmate recognize or understand any fact which might exist
which would make his punishment unjust or unlawful, or... to convey such
information to counsel or to the court?2 6
Whether the single question of competency to understand the execu-
tion is used, or the additional component of competency to assist coun-
sel is required, the legal test remains fairly straightforward.
However, "as is often true of common-law principles.... the rea-
sons for the rule are less sure and less uniform than the rule itself."27
The most common rationale behind the policy for not allowing the
"insane" to suffer execution can be traced at least as far back as Black-
stone, who noted:
If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment,
judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of non-
sane memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity
of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might have
alleged something in stay of execution.2 8
Other rationale summarized by the Supreme Court in Ford in-
clude: (1) the execution simply offends humanity; (2) the execution
provides no example to others and thus contributes nothing to
whatever deterrence value is intended to be served by capital punish-
ment; (3) it is uncharitable to dispatch an offender into another world
when he is incapable of preparing for it; (4) execution serves no pur-
pose because madness is its own punishment; and (5) retribution is not
served, as the life taken has a "lesser value" than that of the crime for
which the offender is to be punished.2 9
In summary, the elements to prove incompetency to a legal deci-
24. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2608 n.3 (1986).
25. Hefilbrun, The Assessment of Competency for Executiow An Overview, 5 BEHAV.
Sci. & L. 383, 386 (1987).
26. A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-5.7(b) (1984).
27. Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2601 (1986).
28. Id. (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-S (1769)).
29. Id.
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sion maker vary little across jurisdictions.3 0 The substantive legal test
does not vary as much as the procedures governing the psychological
assessment of the competency. Although the psychological assess-
ment also is relatively straightforward, the unique context in which
the assessment is conducted presents considerations usually not en-
countered by clinicians.
IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
An overview of the issues which routinely arise in forensic assess-
ment as well as the specific clinical approaches for assessing compe-
tencies in the criminal context can be found elsewhere and need not
be reviewed here.31 However, there are both evaluation and treat-
ment issues which are unique to the administration of "competency to
be executed" evaluations.
A. Evaluation Issues
Because of the specificity contained in the legal test, the assess-
ment for competency to be executed may be one of the easier assess-
ments made in the forensic field. Providing enough relevant
information to the legal decision maker may not necessitate extensive
clinical expertise. Indeed, one questions whether the expertise of a
clinician is needed at all. Professor Morse notes:
[A]lithough the law has given mental experts considerable responsibility for
helping decide legal questions raised by crazy behavior, experts have less com-
petence to assist in these decisions than is commonly believed. Moreover,
much of the factual knowledge necessary for legal decision making is accessi-
ble to lay observers as well as experts.3 2
This may be particularly true in the context of the death row inmate
whose every behavior may be monitored by state actors.33
If, however, a clinician is called upon to assess the prisoner, the
following psycholegal factors should be considered: possible sources of
bias, limits of confidentiality, the prisoner's competency to consent,
30. Ward and Heilbrun both provide a summary of specific statutes and the varying
definitions of competency. See Hefilbrun, supra note 25, at 383; Ward, Compe-
tency for Execution: Problems in Law and Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35
(1986). It should be noted that because of a presumption towards competency, the
burden of proving these elements remains with the defendant.
31. See ag., T. GRisso, EVALUATION CoMPETENCIES: FoRENsIc ASSESSMENTs AND IN-
STRUMENTS (1986); G. MELTON, J. PETRiLA, N. PoYTHREss & C. SLOBoGiN, PsY-
CHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS (1987) [hereinafter PYSciHOLOGICAL
EVALUATIONS].
32. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law,
51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 602 (1976).
33. Ewing, Diagnosing and Treating "Insanity" on Death Row: Legal and Ethical
Perspectives, 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 175 (1987).
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the prisoner's fifth amendment right, and reporting of the findings to
the legal decision maker.
A finding of competency to be executed has the almost inevitable
consequence of the prisoner being executed. For this reason, clini-
cians should be particularly concerned that a personal bias for or
against the death penalty does not influence their evaluation. An ad-
ditional source of bias may stem from whatever party has hired the
clinician. In many states, the evaluation is carried out at the request
of the state. With the state as the client, the evaluator should make
his or her role clear to the prisoner at the outset of the evaluation.
The Ethical Principles of Psychologists require that the person to
be examined be told the nature and purpose of the exam, as well as
the limits of confidentiality.34 Additionally, the American Psychologi-
cal Association Ethical Principles state that individuals have a "free-
dom of choice with regard to participation" in any assessment
procedures.3 5 Thus, in an effort to obtain consent, the beginning of
any evaluation should include remarks explaining the nature and pur-
pose of the examination.
An initial inquiry may be necessary to determine whether a pris-
oner is competent enough to consent to such an evaluation. This com-
petency determination has implications for the "competency to be
executed" evaluation. If the prisoner is found incompetent to give
consent, the evaluation to determine competency to be executed still
may be carried out, although the prior finding alone may present
strong evidence of incompetency to suffer execution. If the prisoner is
found competent yet refuses to give consent, the suggestion has been
made that an evaluator take the following steps: (1) advise the pris-
oner of any known sanctions that may be imposed as a result of the
refusal; (2) arrange for the prisoner to talk with his or her attorney for
further explanations; (3) advise the individual whether a report may
be sent anyway and of the implications of the refusal for the complete-
ness or validity of the report; and (4) take precautions against the use
of "scare tactics" to coerce the individual's participation.36 The latter
is particularly important in the present case where a clinician may
threaten to recommend a finding of "competent to be executed" un-
less consent to the evaluation is given. By not making such a threat,
respect for the prisoner's autonomy is affirmed.
A similar issue concerns the prisoner's fifth amendment right to
silence. Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on the
issue of whether a defendant who is about to undergo an evaluation
for competency to be executed has a right to remain silent, an analogy
34. AMERIcAN PSYCHOLOGICAL AS'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS (1981).
35. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS Prin-
ciple 6 (1981).
36. PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS, supra note 31, at 55.
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can be drawn from a previous ruling in Estelle v. Smith.37 In Estelle,
the Court held that there was "no basis to distinguish between the
guilt and penalty phases of a capital murder trial so far as the protec-
tion of the fifth amendment privilege is concerned." 38 Thus, in mat-
ters of sentencing evaluations, the state should not be able to obtain its
own clinical evaluation on capital sentencing issues unless the defend-
ant decides to use a clinical evaluation at the capital sentencing
hearing.
For "competency to be executed" evaluations, the sentencing has
already taken place. One important limitation the Court noted was
that Estelle did "not hold that the same Fifth Amendment concerns
are necessarily presented by all types of interviews and examinations
that might be ordered or relied upon to inform a sentencing determi-
nation."3 9 The Court thus retreated from advocating a strong fifth
amendment position across assessment contexts. In balancing a pris-
oner's interest in remaining silent against the state's interest in not
executing incompetent prisoners, the court probably would favor the
state and allow the assessment.
From a practical view, the exercise of a right to remain silent al-
most always would work to the disadvantage of the prisoner. First, if
the prisoner were competent enough to understand his fifth amend-
ment right, this would present evidence of reasoning similar to that
necessary to understand his execution. Conversely, if the defendant
understood his right and then chose to remain silent, a clinician may
be hard pressed to show that the defendant was not competent to be
executed.
Finally, a clinician needs to pay special attention in wording the
forensic report. Although the language contained in the legal test
may be simple, the clinician should be careful not to report his find-
ings in terms of answering the ultimate legal question. The question
of whether a prisoner is competent to be executed is a legal and moral
judgement beyond the scope of authority of mental health experts.40
B. Treatment Issues
A clinician called upon to perform an evaluation for competency to
be executed is not being asked for a specific diagnosis or whether the
prisoner is amenable to treatment. However, clinicians may be called
upon to provide treatment for those determined to be incompetent to
be executed. Thus, in performing the evaluation for competency to be
executed, the examiner may find himself indirectly evaluating
37. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
38. Id. at 462.63.
39. Id. at 469 n.13.
40. For discussion on the difference between legal and clinical questions, see supm
note 31.
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whether the prisoner is in need of treatment. Indeed, should some
psychopathology be found, some argue that the clinician has an ethical
duty4 l to provide therapy for the inmate's psychological suffering.
For clinicians treating incompetent prisoners, the purpose of the
"treatment" is subject to debate. Is the treatment designed primarily
to relieve suffering or to restore the prisoner to competency? From a
legal standpoint, the clear goal is to restore the prisoner to compe-
tency. However, from the ethical obligations of the therapist, the goal
is to relieve suffering. Whatever the reason, the ultimate effect of
such treatment hastens the death of the prisoner.
There are no clear ethical guidelines for clinicians charged with
the responsibility of treating death row inmates found incompetent to
be executed. Some have argued that in order to remain true to hu-
manitarian goals, clinicians should avoid the role altogether.42 In con-
trast, others have suggested that the decision to execute is a legal, not
a medical one, and thus treatment should be administered in order to
relieve the suffering of the inmate.43 The withholding of treatment on
the ground that the execution will be hastened may represent a con-
cealed protest against the death penalty.44
V. NEBRASKA'S STATUTE
A. Constitutional Deficiencies
In 1973 Nebraska enacted a statute setting forth the procedures for
determining the sanity of convicts under the sentence of death. In
1986, some slight modifications were made to the statute, changing its
language to reflect sex neutrality and substituting the word "incompe-
tency" for "insanity."45 Surprisingly, no changes were made to rem-
41. See Mossman, Assessing and Restoring Competency to be Executed: Should Psy-
chiatrists Participate?, 5 BEHAV. ScI. & L. 397, 407 (1987).
42. See Ewing, supra note 33. See also Radlett & Barnard, Ethics and the Psychiatric
Determination of Competency to be Executed, 14 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 37 (1986).
43. See, e.g., Mossman, supra note 41.
44. Mossman, supra note 41, at 402.
45. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2537 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
Convict: appears to be mentally incompetent, notice to judge; suspend sentence;
commission appointed; findings; suspension of execution; when. If any convict
under sentence of death shall appear to be mentally incompetent, the
warden or sheriff having him or her in custody shall forthwith give no-
tice thereof to a judge of the district court of the judicial district in which
the convict was tried and sentenced and such judge shall at once make
such investigation as shall satisfy him or her as to whether a commission
ought to be named to examine such convict.
If he or she shall determine that there is not sufficient reason for the
appointment of a commission, he or she shall so find and refuse to sus-
pend the execution of the convict. If the judge shall determine that a
commission ought to be appointed to examine such convict, he or she
[Vol. 67:718
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edy provisions found to be unconstitutional by the Court in Ford. In
light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Ford, the Nebraska statute fails
to pass constitutional muster for the same reasons the Florida statute
was found defective. The statute does not provide the prisoner a role
in the fact-finding process. Nor does the statute allow the prisoner to
challenge the testimony which is used in determining the decision of
his competency. The statute also fails to meet the third objection
raised by the majority in Ford, that the decision be made by a neutral
fact finder. Under the current Nebraska statute, the determination of
competency to be executed is mandated if two of three state examin-
ers determine that the prisoner is competent.46 Like other state stat-
utes, the statute, at a minimum, must be revised in order to meet these
three constitutional objections.
B. Psycholegal Considerations
A close examination of Nebraska's statute reveals other issues
shall make a finding to that effect and cause it to be entered upon the
records of the district court in the county in which such convict was sen-
tenced, and, if necessary, the judge shall suspend the execution and ap-
point the three superintendents of the state centers at Lincoln, Hastings,
and Norfolk as a commission to examine such convict. The commission
shall examine the convict with a view of determining whether he or she
is mentally competent or mentally incompetent and shall report its find-
ings in writing to such judge within ten days after its appointment. If for
any reason any of such superintendents cannot serve in such capacity,
the judge shall appoint in his or her place one of the assistant superin-
tendents of such center. If two of the commission shall find the convict
mentally incompetent, the judge shall suspend his or her execution until
further order. Any time thereafter, when it shall be made to appear to
the judge that the convict has become mentally competent, he or she
shall appoint a commission in the manner provided in this section, who
shall make another investigation as to the mental competency of the
convict, and in said case said convict is again declared mentally incompe-
tent, his or her execution shall be suspended by the judge until further
order. Such proceedings may be had at such times as the judge shall
order until it is either determined that the convict is mentally competent
or incurably mentally incompetent.
46. In Nebraska, the psychiatric examination is conducted by a commission of super-
intendents or assistants of state regional centers at Lincoln, Hastings, and Nor-
folk. Although the judge is to appoint three superintendents from the three
regional centers, the determination of "competent enough to suffer execution" is
mandated if two of the three find the convict competent. This provision is consti-
tutionally defective according to Ford, as the three superintendents are officers of
the state, albeit in an indirect way. The governor appoints the Director of Public
Institutions, who in turn hires the superintendents. Because the evaluation team
is still ultimately under the control of the executive branch, the statute places the
decision of execution wholly within the executive branch. Thus, the Nebraska
statute fails to meet the due process requirement outlined in Ford, that is, that a
neutral fact finder make the determination of insanity. Additionally, the clini-
cians in charge of the evaluation are expressly working for the state, raising a
potential bias in performing the evaluation.
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which must be addressed if a thorough revision is to be undertaken.
Taking into account the role of the clinician, the following issues are
examined: how the plea is initially raised; notice; judge's approval of
the examination; standard of competency to be used; characteristics of
death row; and repeated claims of incompetency. How the plea of in-
competency initially is raised is an important initial consideration.
Currently, the statute provides that the warden or sheriff having cus-
tody initially may raise the issue.47 This procedure invites an arbi-
trary decision. Moreover, vesting the warden or sheriff with
unreviewable discretion may deprive the prisoner of minimal due pro-
cess protection. Unlike some jurisdictions, it is unclear whether man-
damus will lie in Nebraska against a warden or sheriff who wrongfully
refuses to initiate the inquiry.48 Clinicians could play a role in educat-
ing those in charge of making such initial determinations. For exam-
ple, information on the warning signs of incompetency could be
distributed through educational seminars.
The procedures to accompany a plea of incompetency also require
attention. The statute presently omits any reference to notice.49 A
prisoner should receive notice that incompetency will delay execution.
A prisoner also should be made aware of the procedures and standards
to be used in reviewing a claim of incompetency. The obvious problem
is that if a prisoner is truly incompetent, it is unlikely that he will be
able to understand the meaning of notice. At least one commentator
has suggested that to overcome this problem, an attorney should be
appointed immediately after sentencing to represent the prisoner un-
til execution.50
The statute also states that the judge of the district court of the
district where the prisoner was tried is to approve the necessity of an
examination.51 It is important to note that the judge approves only of
an examination, not a trial, once the issue is raised. Thus, by the time
a clinician becomes involved, at least two lay people already are satis-
fied that a genuine issue of incompetency exists. Additionally, one of
these two - the warden - probably has had extensive contact with
the prisoner and may provide useful information in conducting the
examination.
The Nebraska statute omits any reference to the standard of in-
competency that is to be used.5 2 There is no Nebraska case law which
provides a standard of incompetency that is uniquely applicable to this
47. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2537 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
48. See Shank v. Todhunter, 189 Ark. 881, 75 S.W.2d 382 (1934)(mandamus upheld,
but only when petitioner makes a prima facia case of insanity).
49. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2537 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
50. Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 88 YALE L.J. 533 (1979).
51. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2537 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
52. See id.
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proceeding. The current test in Nebraska of mental competency to
stand trial is whether the defendant has the capacity to understand
the nature and object of proceedings against him, to comprehend his
own condition in reference to such proceedings, and to make a rational
defense.53 Implicit in the omission of a standard in the statute is that
the definition of incompetency provided in other stages of the criminal
justice system be used as the standard. In cases of such confusion, cli-
nicians should make some effort to ascertain the standard the court is
expecting to use in making the final determination.
For the clinician, the particular characteristics of death row also
must be taken into account. The process of being condemned to die at
some indefinite point in the future while being confined for prolonged
periods in the brutalizing and dehumanizing conditions on a "death
row" has been suggested to lead to insanity.M Suicide attempts are not
uncommon to inmates of death row, which often indicates an early
symptom of psychological impairment. Clinicians should consider the
entire context when performing the evaluation.
The entire process brings up an interesting if not circular problem.
The state sentences a prisoner to die and sends him to death row.
Death row conditions increase the probability of the prisoner becom-
ing incompetent.5 5 The state cannot then execute the incompetent
prisoner.
In Nebraska, if the commission finds the prisoner incompetent, the
execution is suspended until further order. The judge is to reappoint a
commission if the convict appears to have regained his competency.
This continues until the prisoner is determined either competent or
incurably incompetent. To handle the problem of a prisoner repeating
claims of incompetency after an unsuccessful attempt, the judge is to
continually assess whether there is sufficient reason for the appoint-
ment of a commission. Justice Powell's suggestion in Ford that a high
threshold be established to initially trigger the process thus is satisfied
by the judge's discretion on whether to appoint a commission.56 In
53. State v. Evans, 218 Neb. 849, 359 N.W.2d 790 (1984).
54. Strafer, Volunteering for Execution: Competency, Voluntariness and the Propri-
ety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 862 (1983). See
also People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 649, 493 P.2d 880, 894, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152,
166 (1972) ("the process of carrying out a verdict of death is often so degrading
and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute psychological torture").
55. Note, Mental Suffering Under Sentence of Deatk A Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ment, 57 IowA L. REv. 814 (1972).
56. The problem of an ad infinitum appeal process in which the prisoner continually
petitions that he is insane appears unresolvable. As one writer concluded. "Some
unreviewable discretion must ultimately be permitted the execution officer."
Comment, Execution of Insane Persons, 23 S. CAL. L REv. 246, 252 (1950). It has
also been suggested that perhaps a higher standard would be needed upon any
subsequent claims of insanity, once it was established at an earlier date that the
prisoner was sane. Note, supra note 50, at 563.
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any subsequent revision of the statute, the availability of a judge to
initially review the evidence provides an effective mechanism to both
cut down the number of complaints and to establish an initial thresh-
old. Again it bears emphasizing that there is no articulated standard
of review in the statute for the judge to use in determining the ap-
pointment of a commission.
In summary, Nebraska's statute must be revised in order to survive
a constitutional challenge. Along with remedying the constitutional
defects identified in Ford, other revisions can be made to improve the
statute. These other modifications include identifying by whom and
how the claim of incompetency may be raised, and identifying both the
standard necessary to trigger determination of competency and the
standard needed to prove competency.
C. Remedying the Statute
In Ford, the Supreme Court suggested that a state look to its stat-
utes regarding competency to stand trial and involuntary commitment
for guidance in constructing appropriate procedures.57 Both Nebraska
statutes presuppose a hearing in the procedures they outline.
Although Nebraska's mental health commitment laws are relevant
to the present issue, there is some difficulty in using these statutes as a
model to revise the statute concerning incompetency to suffer execu-
tion. The primary purpose of the mental health commitment statutes
is to assist a person in resisting the label of mental illness. Those stat-
utes contain due process requirements designed to safeguard personal
liberty. In contrast, the prisoner awaiting execution has no liberty in-
terest at stake. The prisoner actually succeeds (avoids execution)
when the label of mental illness is applied. As the mental health com-
mitment statutes were constructed for the purpose of resisting the la-
bel of mental illness, its utility would depend on how well its purpose
is thought to parallel the purpose of the post-conviction insanity
statute.
Currently, Nebraska's mental health commitment statutes provide
the following: a right to be represented by council, the right to in-
dependent evaluation, the right to appear personally and be afforded
the opportunity to testify on one's behalf, the right to present wit-
nesses and tangible evidence in defending against the petition at the
hearing, and the right to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses and evidence equivalent to the rights granted under the United
57. This section assumes that the statute should be remedied, rather than an alterna-
tive course of eliminating the procedure altogether. Such a conclusion would en-
tail abolishing the death penalty. The availability of a stay of execution based on
incompetency opens another procedure for prisoners wishing to delay execution,
thus increasing the state's expense in maintaining the system.
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States Constitution and Nebraska Constitution.58 The statutes also al-
low the person to waive any of these rights.59
By adopting language from these mental health commitment stat-
utes, the state would be able to remedy the current constitutional de-
fects. Specifically, by allowing a prisoner to present evidence in his
own behalf and cross-examine evidence, two of the three constitu-
tional defects would be remedied. The ability to present evidence in
his own behalf would include the right to an independent examina-
tion. The third constitutional objection raised in Ford, that the deci-
sion be made by a neutral fact finder, almost necessitates the need for
a trial, or at least a hearing. The solution to resolving all of the consti-
tutional problems found in the statute is to revise the statute to guar-
antee the right to an independent evaluation, the right to present
evidence, the right to challenge evidence, and the right to have the
decision made by a neutral party.
The Ford Court also suggested a state look to its criminal statute
for determining competency for guidance. Nebraska's insanity de-
fense statute60 sets a standard of preponderance of the evidence and
places the burden on the defendant to prove the defense of not respon-
sible by reason of insanity. In revising the present "incompetent to be
executed" statute, two standards need to be explicated - one to ini-
tially determine whether a trial should be held, and the other to deter-
mine what threshold need be passed in order to meet the definition of
incompetency. A low standard, such as preponderance of the evi-
dence, should be set to initially trigger judicial review of claims of in-
competency. A low standard would lessen the discretion of those
determining whether a trial is necessary and safeguard the incompe-
tent prisoner's chance of being heard. A higher standard could be im-
posed to determine whether the prisoner is actually incompetent once
he has made it beyond the initial threshold.
The Nebraska statute further allows for an annual review by the
court. This procedure may help reduce some of the difficulty of the
ethical dilemma faced by the psychotherapist. However, a procedure
should be set up so that those in charge of treatment will not be those
who review the case for the court.
VI. CONCLUSION
Of the many other areas where psychology is called upon by the
law to assist the fact finder, none contain the dilemmas of a "compe-
tency to be executed" examination. When the prisoner is mentally ill,
the ability of the state to take a life depends almost exclusively on the
58. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 83-1049, 83-1052, 83-1056, 83-1058, 83-1059 (1987).
59. Id.
60. NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2203 (1985).
1988]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
results of this examination. For this reason, this article has focused on
the complex interaction of psychological and legal factors which cur-
rently govern "competency to be executed" examinations and has sug-
gested ways that may improve the alliance between the mental health
and legal professions.
The Supreme Court's decision in Ford has constitutionally invali-
dated many state statutes for determining the competency of prison-
ers awaiting execution. How these statutes are eventually remedied
will affect the legal context in which "competency to be executed"
evaluations are carried out. Those who ultimately revise competency
statutes would do well to take into account the effect of procedural
changes on the actual clinical assessment. Particular attention should
be paid to the ethical and practical considerations facing an evaluator
called upon to perform a "competency to be executed" evaluation.
In order to comply with the due process demands of Ford, revisions
of such statutes should include a hearing by a neutral fact finder, the
right to an independent evaluation, the right to present evidence, and
the right to challenge evidence. Additional revisions might include ar-
ticulating the standard to be used both in triggering the due process
requirements and in determining competency. Clinicians should play
an active role in reforming these laws in order to lessen the potential
for ethical dilemmas and to insure that incompetent prisoners are not
executed.
Mark A. Small '90
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